



RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

REPORT ON CUBAN PROPAGANDA -- NO. 1

BEHAVIOR OF HAVANA MEDIA DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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PROPAGANDA REPORT
6 NOVEMBER 1962

This is the first in a series of reports which will treat selected salient aspects of Havana radio and television propaganda on domestic and international affairs.

The present report, based on a series of daily reviews of Havana output prepared by FBIS during the Cuban crisis, documents the behavior of Havana media from the inception of the crisis on through 6 November.

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CHRONOLOGY

23-24 OCTOBER Page 1

Havana reacted to the President's 22 October speech an hour and a half after it was delivered and six and a half hours before Radio Moscow first reported it. A commentary by Luis Gomez Wanguemert, setting the tone for subsequent comment, charged U.S. "irresponsibility," gave assurances of Soviet and bloc support for Cuba, and avoided direct denial of the President's statements about missile sites. The naval "blockade" was called an "act of war," and the distinction between a blockade and a quarantine was discounted. Radio Havana announced that the Cuban armed forces would be mobilized. Castro spoke on the 24th, assailing U.S. "aggression" and rejecting "any attempt at inspection of our country." Claiming wide Latin American support for Cuba, Havana media ignored the OAS approval of the U.S. measures.

25-26 OCTOBER Page 4

Reportage of rallies and defense measures were given heavy play, but comment welcoming U Thant's appeal saw grounds for optimism that the President might call off the quarantine. Havana media continued to avoid direct denials of the presence of Soviet rocket bases in Cuba, arguing that a country's weapons were its own affair and that the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons was spurious. Heavy stress continued to be placed on a portrayal of worldwide and Latin American support for Cuba.

27-30 OCTOBER Page 6

The Khrushchev-Kennedy exchange of 27 October was publicized with negligible comment. Havana media did not acknowledge the contents of Khrushchev's 28 October letter until 11 hours after Moscow released it and eight hours after the release of Castro's statement laying down his "five demands." Khrushchev's letter was never broadcast in full by the Havana radio. Castro's statement was given saturation coverage--repeated as many as 30 times in one radio service alone--and was given voluminous propaganda support. Raul Castro's 29 October speech, endorsing the five demands as "minimal" and stressing the demand for U.S. evacuation of Guantanamo, was widely echoed by Havana commentators.

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27-30 OCTOBER (Continued)

By the 30th commentators were referring frequently to Khrushchev's 28 October letter, emphasizing Soviet and Cuban "firmness" which had "forced the President to negotiate." When specified at all, the decision to dismantle the Soviet bases was called a wise move to enable the Castro regime to carry out its program. There were optimistic statements ("our people and Fidel" now "look serenely to the future"), balanced by warnings ("our people are well acquainted with... the evil cunning of the powerful neighbor to the north" and Cuba must "remain on a war footing..., ready to repel any aggression"). Havana media reported U Thant's arrival at Castro's "invitation," to "discuss and not to inspect."

31 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER Page 12

U Thant's first meeting with Castro was said to have ended "without any agreement." It was called useful because the Cuban side had "fixed clearly its positions and views." Publicity was given the arrival of Mikoyan, "an old friend of Cuba." Castro, speaking on Havana television, again rejected inspection as an "attempt to humiliate our country." He insisted that Cuba had not hindered the removal of the missile bases, and explained for the first time that the weapons were "not Cuba's property." He referred to "some differences" with the Soviet Government, and went on to profess confidence in the Soviet leadership and to insist that there would be "no breaches" between "Marxist-Leninists." The Cubans "must, more than ever, remember how good, generous, noble, and friendly the Soviets have been."

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Heavily playing Castro's TV statement, Havana commentators emphasized his rejection of inspection--and insisted at the same time on the "comradely" nature of Soviet-Cuban differences. The exigencies of the situation were acknowledged in one commentator's statement (in a broadcast to the Americas) that "the building of socialism, under Cuba's circumstances, is closely tied to aid from the socialist camp, and particularly from the Soviet Union." There were assurances, echoing Castro, that there would be "no breach"--and reminders of the USSR's friendly "and generous" support.

(Continued)

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2 - 6 NOVEMBER (Continued)

Conceding that "more than a few premature judgments" had been made in "the dramatic and pressing circumstances," one commentator said Castro had made "the only possible statement" in affirming Soviet-Cuban friendship. Friendship "and aid," he said, would emerge strengthened from the Castro-Mikoyan talks. In briefly citing Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen I's 1 November note to Castro, in the context of claims of worldwide support for Cuba, Havana commentators ignored Chen I's blatantly polemical statements conveying Peking's view of a sellout of Cuba by "the big powers."

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BEHAVIOR OF HAVANA MEDIA DURING THE CUBAN CRISIS23-24 OCTOBERTHE PRESIDENT'S
SPEECH

The first monitored Havana reaction to the President's 22 October speech was a talk by regular commentator Luis Gomez Wanguemert on television just an hour and a half after the speech was delivered and six and a half hours before Radio Moscow reported it. Gomez Wanguemert urged the Cuban people to "remain serene and tranquil," continue with their work, and rest assured that their government would take the proper steps. Calling the moves announced by the President further evidence of the "irresponsibility" of the U.S. Government, he suggested that President Kennedy had not been convinced of the seriousness of the Soviet "warning" regarding aggression against Cuba. Insisting that Cuba had no aggressive designs on anyone, he spoke of U.S. sensitivity to a "nonexistent danger" and acknowledged the President's statement about the missile sites in a reference to "alleged medium-range rockets."

This broadcast established the line for subsequent comment. Havana propagandists repeated that it was aggression by the United States that prompted the Soviet Union to supply Cuba with "defensive weapons," reiterated that there was no danger of aggressive action from Cuba, and carefully avoided direct denial that Soviet medium- and intermediate-range missiles had been established in Cuba.

Gomez Wanguemert's assurance to the Cubans that they were "not alone" was echoed repeatedly in comment declaring that the Castro regime had the full support of "the Soviet Union, the entire socialist bloc, and other peaceful and friendly peoples." The commentator attempted at the same time to picture support for Cuba by the common people in all Latin American countries and in the United States; He referred to a Gallup Poll finding that 75 percent of the American people opposed military action against Cuba; and he objected to President Kennedy's reference to a threat to Mexico City, "capital of a country that has always been our friend." Much of the subsequent comment similarly cited the Gallup Poll to document assurances that the American people did not support the action taken by their government. PRENSA LATINA dispatches from several Latin American capitals were devoted almost entirely to quotations from leftwing newspapers and organizations expressing opposition to the U.S. measures.

The first monitored comment on the President's speech in Havana's international service for the Americas came four and a half hours after the speech.

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This broadcast pointed again to the Gallup Poll in an effort to show that the President did not have the support of his own people.

Latin American countries in which PRENSA LATINA found support for Castro included Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile. The earliest dispatches from Montevideo consisted of quotations from EPOCA and other leftwing Uruguayan newspapers and organizations denouncing the "stupidity" and "madness" of President Kennedy's action and declaring that "Cuba is not alone, nor will it be conquered." According to PRENSA LATINA, the Uruguayan Socialist Party Executive Committee held a hurried meeting immediately after President Kennedy's speech and issued a call to all socialist parties in all Latin American countries to join in a "blockade of all U.S. interests in Latin America."

Under a Santiago, Chile, dateline early on 24 October, PRENSA LATINA reported that the Chilean Popular Action Front had called upon all workers, peasants, students, women, youths, and so forth, to combat the "insane" U.S. "actions directed against Cuba." The statement added that one principal aim of the U.S. Government was to "frighten Latin American countries and stop the development of national freedom movements in each of them."

QUARANTINE AN
"ACT OF WAR"

Havana's initial international-service comment on the President's speech called the quarantine "an act of war." The domestic audience heard commentator Kuchilan make the same charge in a television broadcast on 23 October. Challenging the President's use of the term "quarantine," Kuchilan stated that the action was known internationally as a "blockade" and was an act of war. "The United States has officially declared war on us," he said, "a war which it has been waging against us without a halt since 1959." Kuchilan added that President Kennedy had gone beyond his powers in calling for a "naval blockade" of Cuba. Congress gave him power, the commentator said, to call up 150,000 men, but nothing more.

Within a few hours after the President's speech Radio Havana announced that the Cuban armed forces had been mobilized and ordered to assume a position of combat readiness; that Premier Castro would address the nation; and that the Cuban Government had called upon the U.N. Security Council to take action to halt U.S. "aggression" against Cuba.

CASTRO INTERVIEW Castro's speech took the form of a radio interview at 0135 GMT on 24 October (2035 hours on 23 October Cuban time), carried in the Havana radio service to the Americas as well as in the domestic service. A large part of the interview was given over to documentation of the charge of U.S. "aggression" against Cuba. Castro also attempted to answer the charge that the Cuban revolution was "betrayed." If that had been true, he said, Cuba would now be a great friend of the "imperialist" United States.

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As regards the Rio Treaty, Castro declared that it had no applicability to Cuba. "What do we care about treaties?" was his response to action taken by the OAS under the terms of the Rio Treaty. Castro denied that there was any danger of aggression against the American continent from Cuba, while avoiding specific denial of President Kennedy's statements about the rocket bases. He ridiculed the distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons, saying that these terms had been "invented" by the "imperialists." He stated defiantly, in regard to Cuban "defensive" measures against U.S. "aggression," that "we do not have to tell them what these measures are, nor do we have to tell them what weapons they are."

As for the sending of observers to Cuba, Castro declared:

We decidedly reject any attempt at supervision, any attempt at inspection of our country. Our country will not be subjected to inspection from any quarter. Our country will never be inspected by anyone because we will never give authorization for that to anyone.... No one can come under the U.N. banner or any other flag to inspect our country.... Anyone who tries to come and inspect Cuba must know that he will have to come equipped for war.

Referring to "alleged photographs" taken by U.S. planes, Castro charged that this constituted a U.S. admission of violation of Cuban airspace. Havana commentator Kuchilan on 24 October similarly contended that if the United States had such photographs, they were obtained by violations of Cuban territory. Kuchilan claimed that despite the air violations and the espionage, the United States had been "unable to learn the location, number, and the real range of the defensive weapons which we have."

OAS MEETING

In his radio interview Castro ignored the unanimous approval of President Kennedy's measures voted by the OAS, although he made several references to U.S. "schemes" to "use" the Latin Americans in its "crime" against Cuba, and spoke of the Latin American governments' "act of betrayal" in allowing themselves to be led by the United States. Castro's brief references to the attitude of other Latin American governments were, however, marked by less invective than usual.

Commentator Kuchilan, speaking on television 23 October while the meeting was in progress, had said the calling of the meeting showed the "cowardice" of President Kennedy, who wanted to get the OAS to back up his "unilateral" action. However, Kuchilan added, Bolivia and Cuba will not be there, and "we hope" that Mexico, Chile, and Brazil "will hold to their independent posture."

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In broadcasts to the Cuban people, the Havana radio kept silent on the OAS stand, the fact that nearly half the Latin American nations volunteered material assistance to the United States in carrying out the quarantine, and the statements by the Chilean and Venezuelan delegates in the U.N. Security Council approving the U.S. resolution. Havana international broadcasts were heard to refer only once to the OAS vote, and not at all to the other two developments: On 24 October, almost 20 hours after the OAS voted 19 to 0 to endorse the U.S. measures, a Havana broadcast to the Americas announced briefly that President Kennedy had seen his prophecy of OAS support fulfilled, as the OAS "today" approved the U.S. draft resolution. The resolution had in fact been approved the preceding day. While this broadcast indulged in the usual invective in its attacks on the United States, it offered no criticism of the Latin American states, nor any comment on the OAS action.

Following the President's speech, PRENSA LATINA dispatches from Brazil, Chile, and Mexico had reported statements by officials and organizations favorable to the Castro regime. And the agency reported promptly and in detail from Montevideo on the Uruguayan cabinet's 24 October action to make the OAS vote unanimous, pointing out that for constitutional reasons Uruguay had expressed a reservation on the sending of armed forces to assist in the U.S. action.

25-26 OCTOBER

U THANT APPEAL While reportage of rallies and defense measures continued to preempt a large amount of Havana's output for domestic audiences, radio and television comment welcoming U Thant's initiative appeared to encourage some optimism about chances for a peaceful solution. A television report on the evening of 25 October went so far as to say, quoting "sources close to the U.S. Government," that President Kennedy soon would call off the quarantine. Commentator Kuchilan, on television a half hour later, spoke of the "reasonable" proposal of U Thant and noted that copies of his appeal had been sent to Castro and Dorticos as well as to Khrushchev and the President.

Commentator Luis Gomez Wanguemert, speaking on television shortly after midnight, reported that Khrushchev had accepted U Thant's proposal; that President Kennedy had authorized Ambassador Stevenson to start preliminary talks; that a Soviet tanker had been allowed to proceed to Havana "without molestation"; and that the USSR "seems to have delayed the arrival of some of its ships to Cuba in order to allow for the development of U Thant's suggestion."

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**ROCKET WEAPONS
AND BASES**

In reporting the Security Council debate, Gomez Wanguemert mentioned Zorin's charge that the U.S. photographs were faked, adding that "there is no question" that the Soviet charge was based on fact. He glossed over the exchange between Zorin and Ambassador Stevenson regarding the presence of rocket bases in Cuba. He implied that there might be hope for settlement of the rocket-bases issue by reporting "an interesting bit of news" from Brazil, where, he said, it had been suggested that all of Latin America be made a nuclear-free zone. This, Gomez Wanguemert said, "would automatically do away with the U.S. pretext of protesting against the alleged launchers of supposedly offensive rockets in Cuba." (Moscow ignored the nuclear-free zone idea.)

While Havana media continued to avoid flat denials that rocket bases had been set up in Cuba, the Cuban ambassador in Cairo (as quoted by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY), said Cuba was ready to negotiate but could not accept the President's condition that rocket bases must be dismantled because there were no such bases. Later he repeated the denial: "There are no rocket bases or Soviet experts in Cuba." Havana media, never anxious to conceal the presence of the technicians and carefully equivocal about the rocket bases, carried no such statement.

A broadcast in English, however, in philosophizing about the relativity of designating weapons as "defensive" or "offensive," implied that the existence of a threat of nuclear attack against a nation would justify that nation--Cuba--in obtaining the kind of weapons that could hit targets "farther than 20 miles away." Just how far, the commentator said, "is a matter to be determined by the experts who are charged with defending the country."

A Havana broadcast to the Americas on 25 October asserted that Puerto Rico had numerous atomic bases, thus giving the lie to President Kennedy's "claim" that Cuba would be "the first Latin American territory equipped with nuclear weapons."

**PORTRAYAL OF
SUPPORT FOR CUBA**

Cuban propaganda continued to portray world reaction as unfavorable to the United States, with a large volume of news items recounting pro-Cuban demonstrations and statements from various Latin American countries. Publicity was given pledges of support for Cuba from leftist organizations in Latin America, particularly in those countries whose governments had previously been reluctant to join in censuring the Castro regime.

PRENSA LATINA, extensively reporting statements and demonstrations by leftwing Latin American labor union and front groups, carried a proclamation by Brazilian Peasant Leagues President Francisco Juliao, which said: "Kennedy must not come to Brazil. He must not come to the northeast...to Recife, the city of freedom, to face our people with his

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pharisaical smile, so that he can continue to plunder the wealth of our country." PRENSA LATINA announced on 26 October that its radioteletype transmissions would be extended to 24-hour daily operation "until further notice."

Havana continued to suppress the news of the unanimous OAS vote in support of the U.S. measures and to ignore the proffers of material aid. PRENSA LATINA reported early on 25 October that the Bolivian foreign minister had said the presence of a Bolivian representative at the OAS meeting in Washington was "unauthorized," that Bolivia would adhere to the "principle of nonintervention" in regard to Cuba, and that the Bolivian Government had yet to meet to determine its position. Such a government meeting was held later in the day and full endorsement was given the action of the representative in Washington, but this fact was not reported by PRENSA LATINA.

SOVIET TANKER Havana on 26 October reported welcoming ceremonies being planned for the crew of the Soviet tanker, "the first Soviet ship that has gone through the imperialist blockade." Commentator Kuchilan announced the same day that "the ship carrying Soviet circus animals" had arrived, despite "reports" that it had been sunk by Alpha 66, "and the show will begin very soon."

CIVIL DEFENSE Kuchilan also referred his listeners to the current issue of BOHEMIA for an "important" set of instructions on civil defense and for information on air bombing, high-explosive bombs, and jet guided missiles--information one should have, he said, to "face the danger threatening us." The Santa Clara radio reported from Las Villas Province on rules for rationing of gasoline and oil. The broadcast warned against hoarding, stating that there was an adequate stock of staple foods. Havana announced a campaign for blood donations, distribution of civil defense instructions, and cancellation of all labor union meetings so that workers could "take up their battle stations on the production front."

27-30 OCTOBER

KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY Khrushchev's 27 October offer to withdraw missile
27 OCTOBER LETTER bases from Cuba in exchange for the removal of U.S.
EXCHANGE bases from Turkey was reported by PRENSA LATINA without comment. Havana broadcast to Cuban audiences a summary of President Kennedy's 27 October letter requiring the dismantling of missile bases as the first prerequisite of any agreement, again without comment. On 28 October, however, a special dispatch by PRENSA LATINA

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to ULTIMA HORA of Santiago, Chile, commented that the President's letter seemed to have "eased the political tension." The dispatch added that the danger of immediate invasion had not disappeared; and it noted that the last group of Soviet "rocketry technicians," who had arrived in Cuba by plane three weeks before, continued "in their posts."

**KHRUSHCHEV'S
28 OCTOBER
LETTER**

Castro's 28 October statement, enumerating the five conditions to be met by the United States if the guarantee against invasion of Cuba was to "exist," was broadcast by Havana about three hours after Moscow released Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle and remove the missile bases. Havana media had been silent until then on Khrushchev's 28 October letter. It was not until 0805 GMT on 29 October--11 hours after Moscow broadcast Khrushchev's letter, and eight hours after Castro had mentioned in his statement that it had been sent--that Havana radio gave its listeners an extensive summary of the Soviet decision. Nearly 10 hours later, at 1800 GMT, a similar summary was carried in a broadcast to the Americas.

The Havana summary quoted Khrushchev accurately on his promise to have the weapons dismantled, crated, and returned to the USSR. It also quoted at length Khrushchev's explanation of his reasons for sending the weapons to Cuba, and repeated his reminder of President Kennedy's promised "guarantee" that Cuba would not be invaded. Nothing was said of Khrushchev's remarks concerning U-2 flights and the possibility of tragedy resulting from reconnaissance flights over Cuba, and there was no reference to his agreement to U.N. inspection of removal of the missiles. The text of Khrushchev's letter was never broadcast by Havana, although it was carried on page three of REVOLUCION for 29 October.

CASTRO STATEMENT Castro's brief statement of 28 October was given saturation coverage by Havana, being broadcast as many as 30 times in one radio service. The radio reported that staffs of two newspapers, REVOLUCION and NOTICIAS DE HOY, were called in on their day off to publish extras carrying the Castro declaration.

The opening paragraph of the statement referred to the "decision announced" by Khrushchev "withdrawing the installations of arms of strategic defense from Cuban territory." Concentrating on President Kennedy's offer to guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba provided the missile bases were removed, the Castro statement said that for such a guarantee to be effective the resultant change in U.S. policy must involve suspension of the economic blockade and of "worldwide economic pressure" exerted on Cuba; cessation of attacks on Cuba from

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U.S. ports by refugees, and of all attempts by refugees to promote revolt against the Castro regime; and the return to Cuba of the Guantanamo naval base.

INSPECTION ISSUE The statement was silent on the issue of inspection or U.N. supervision of the removal of missiles and bases. In his radio interview of 23 October Castro had bitterly denounced the idea of U.N. supervision and declared that anyone coming to Cuba with the idea of inspection should be prepared for gunfire. Havana media subsequently ignored this issue until the afternoon of 29 October, when a PRENSA LATINA dispatch to two Chilean papers quoted from Castro's 23 October interview to illustrate his attitude on the question of U.N. inspection. Noting that there had been "no official announcement" in Havana concerning the coming visit of U Thant, it said that although "the mediation of Mr. Thant is looked upon with sympathy," Fidel Castro had already warned that Cuba would "not accept international commissions or inspectors or investigating missions."

**RAUL CASTRO
SPEECH** Despite the heavy publicity for Castro's five points, there was very little Havana comment on them until late on 29 October, more than 24 hours after the statement was released. Raul Castro in a 29 October speech in Oriente Province quoted the statement in full, but commented only on the demand that the Guantanamo base be relinquished. He described the five points as the "minimum demand," a term subsequently reiterated by Cuban propagandists. He said that in giving up the base the United States would make use of "the best opportunity for the President of the United States to show that his words are sincere."

Guantanamo was not the only U.S. base on foreign soil, Raul Castro pointed out, but it differed from the others in that the United States had the "legalistic argument that the bases are authorized by the puppet governments" in the other cases. In Cuba, he asserted, both the people and the government wanted the United States to get out. Later propaganda references to Guantanamo generally followed Raul Castro's line.

**PROPAGANDA SUP-
PORT FOR "FIVE
POINTS"** Havana broadcasts and PRENSA LATINA transmissions described Castro's five points as "minimal" and "indispensable" if peace was to be obtained and the U.S. guarantee was to be effective. On 30 October there were several reports of endorsements of the five points by groups of Cubans and by organizations and newspapers in other Latin American countries. A Havana domestic service broadcast spoke of "firm support" for Castro "while he is setting down the conditions for peace negotiations." Another broadcast asserted that any agreement reached "must, of course,"

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accept the conditions laid down by Castro. A commentary in English early on the morning of 30 October explained that "we have no faith in the promises of President Kennedy" and know that we cannot trust the "madmen of the Pentagon." Therefore, "the world stands with Cuba as it awaits the answer to our Premier's five points."

Most references to the five points mentioned the demand that the United States give up Guantanamo. A television commentator declared that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Guantanamo naval base is within Cuba's rights and in response to the opportunity afforded by the times in which we live." A radio commentary explained that return of the base was "necessary to solution of the problem" because the sole purpose of the United States in holding the base was to use it as a "springboard of aggression and provocation."

PRENSA LATINA reviewed several Havana editorials stating that the President's guarantees were worthless unless backed by deeds, including the return of Guantanamo and the dismantling of the "criminal U.S. war machinery." Blas Roca declared in East Germany, the agency said, that the conditions for settling the Cuban situation were contained in Castro's five points; the President's guarantees were meaningless if these conditions were not met.

The 30 October PRENSA LATINA dispatch to Chilean papers introduced a new element into the propaganda on Guantanamo: PRENSA LATINA complained that the base had become a center for "reporter information pools" to promote the "criminal irresponsibility" of the U.S. press. These "pools" had "falsified" Raul Castro's speech and had inaccurately ascribed some statements to Fidel Castro that had led to confusion in Bolivia. But this charge was not pursued in subsequent propaganda.

LATIN AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR CUBA Havana's broadcasts in the period following release of Khrushchev's letter, as during the entire period of the Cuban crisis, projected an image of a threatened and courageous Cuba supported enthusiastically by popular opinion, especially in Latin America. A hated and aggressive U.S. imperialism was pictured as bitterly opposed by the vast majority of the world's common people. A large proportion of Havana broadcasts focused on reports of support from hundreds of organizations and groups outside Cuba, pro-Castro statements from leftwing Latin American papers, and anti-American demonstrations. The sabotage in Venezuelan oil installations was given considerable play by Cuban propagandists, and strong exception was taken to U.S. news reports that Cubans had directed the sabotage. These reports were called "infamous and absurd," distributed for "perverse and malevolent purposes."

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The fact that the OAS voted unanimously to back the U.S. measures against Cuba and that half of its members volunteered to furnish material aid to the blockade was still suppressed, although there were occasional hints that certain Latin American governments--without popular support--had sold out to the "imperialists." Raul Castro in his Oriente speech had used this line in remarking that "the puppet governments" are one thing and "the peoples they hypocritically claim to represent are another." He acknowledged that the other Latin Americans had, through the OAS, approved the U.S. measures against Cuba and even referred to the fact that some of these nations were offering material support. A special program to the Dominican Republic on 30 October, ostensibly directed by the "Dominican Liberation Front," castigated the Dominican Government for offering its port to the United States during the naval blockade.

U THANT'S
ARRIVAL

Castro's original letter to U Thant inviting him to visit Havana, sent prior to the 28 October Khrushchev letter, was publicized by the Havana press and radio. After the release of Khrushchev's letter, and after U Thant had accepted Castro's invitation, Havana media said little about the coming visit, although it was mentioned in a few broadcasts. U Thant's actual arrival in Havana on 30 October was reported promptly, and REVOLUCION was quoted as pointing out that he had come "to negotiate, not to inspect." When referring to the visit, broadcasts were careful to say that U Thant was "invited" to Cuba by Castro, and the purpose of his visit was described as "discussion of the Caribbean crisis directly with Premier Castro."

Havana broadcast President Kennedy's rejection of U Thant's proposal that Soviet ships avoid the quarantine while the United States in turn would avoid confrontation of Soviet vessels. The radio gave heavy coverage to Khrushchev's acceptance of the proposal, stressing the "peaceful" efforts of Khrushchev along with Castro's invitation to U Thant.

The lifting of the quarantine was not reported by Havana until after U Thant's arrival in Cuba. Prior to that, the radio had apparently sought to convey the idea that the blockade was ineffective by presenting speakers from "the first Cuban ship to break the imperialist blockade." A television commentator remarked that despite the blockade, "the Soviet merchantmen have kept coming to our country. Oil and other shipments are still coming from that distant friendly country."

CUBAN DEFENSE
EFFORTS

Cuban defense efforts continued to be emphasized. Broadcasts pictured an enthusiastic military and civil populace working hard to meet the onslaught of a brutal aggressor and confident of victory. Several broadcasts called for blood donors. The defense effort was said to include

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production, which had not been allowed to lag because of the military mobilization. One broadcast, in discussing the defense effort, warned that food should not be stored, as this would create "artificial scarcities," and a broadcast late on 30 October appealed to housewives to refrain from purchasing in the morning enough bread to last through the day.

Following U Thant's arrival in Havana, the Havana radio and television network gave added attention to Cuban military strength. The radio on 30 October announced both artillery practices and naval maneuvers, while a television program in the afternoon showed inspection visits to various military posts by Fidel Castro and President Dorticos. The telecast showed Cuban troops wearing Russian helmets; long-range artillery pieces, antitank guns, and antiaircraft artillery were also pictured.

ASSESSMENT OF
KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY
AGREEMENT

Now referring frequently to Khrushchev's 28 October letter, Havana commentators emphasized Soviet and Cuban "firmness" which had "impelled" President Kennedy to negotiate. When discussed at all, Khrushchev's decision to dismantle the missiles was called a wise move taken for the purpose of guaranteeing the Castro regime freedom to carry out its program. There were a number of optimistic statements: Now "our people and Fidel" again "look serenely to the future," REVOLUCION wrote on 30 October. The "heroism of the Cuban people" had "again moved the world," in the face of President Kennedy's "preparation against our country of all the aggressive forces of the monopolists and the Pentagon." PRENSA LATINA attributed to a Uruguayan paper the statement that "clear skies" were now visible as a result of "the Soviet people's concern for humanity." The Soviet Union had "imposed the path of negotiations," and "peace has been saved." PRENSA LATINA, transmitting to Chilean papers, declared that "socialism has arrived in America and will never depart."

But there were also warnings. PRENSA LATINA, in proclaiming the irreversible arrival of "socialism," said the President had signed a truce which "for the moment paralyzes plans for invasion of Cuba." And a Havana broadcast in English complained that U.S. news media were ignoring the fact that part of the bargain had been a promise that Cuba would not be invaded. Considerable emphasis was put on a need for some concrete demonstration of U.S. sincerity, such as the return of Guantanamo. Kuchilan and Luis Gomez Wanguemert played the theme that all U.S. promises were unreliable. Kuchilan declared: "We are maintaining our state of alert and war footing because the enemy is crafty and armed, and Mr. Kennedy is a solemn liar." Gomez Wanguemert said: "Our people are well acquainted with the habits and evil cunning of the powerful neighbor to the north." For this reason, he added, "the Cuban people remain on a war footing, their arms in their hands and ready to repel any aggression."

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31 OCTOBER - 1 NOVEMBER

CASTRO'S DEMANDS Castro's five demands continued to get wide publicity. Comment immediately after the release of the Castro statement had stressed the demand that the United States evacuate Guantanamo. Practically all discussion centered on the claim that approval of the five points was essential because "imperialist" promises alone would not suffice. Now Havana broadcasts began to place greater emphasis on popular support for the Cuban cause and on the Cuban people's demand that the United States accept all five points before any settlement was possible.

On 1 November several broadcasts played up the demand that economic pressure on Cuba be ended. PRENSA LATINA also quoted foreign press statements to the effect that the United States "must guarantee an end to counterrevolutionary acts against Cuba," and the Havana paper EL MUNDO asserted that "internal peace will not be possible until the United States stops all its subversive activities against our republic."

U THANT TALKS Broadcasts on 31 October, reporting U Thant's first meeting with Castro, said that "the Cuban side fixed clearly its position and points of view without any agreement being reached." Commentators decried "distorted reports" of U Thant's visit in the U.S. press, which "stressed that Thant was going to Cuba to resolve the problem of dismantling of the guided missile bases." Actually, according to the Havana radio, it was pointed out in the correspondence between U Thant and Castro that the idea was to discuss "all the important aspects of the problem."

In reporting the ending of U Thant's talks with Castro, Havana said the Cuban people would be informed of the nature and development of the talks in an address by Castro on 1 November. A Havana radio commentary stated that Cuba was prepared to undertake negotiations with any country, including the United States, on a plane of equality and mutual respect. However, peace must be "imposed" on the "imperialists." Luis Gomez Wanguemert called the talks with U Thant "useful" because they established a link between the United Nations and the Cuban problem and gave the U.S. negotiators a "more exact" opinion of Cuba's position. Castro's five demands were designed to "give substance" to President Kennedy's guarantee against an invasion, the commentator stated, adding that "vigorous support" for the Cuban position was coming from abroad. A PRAVDA article was cited in this context.

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MIKOYAN VISIT

A Kuchilan talk over the Havana television network on 31 October contained Cuban media's first--brief--comment on the forthcoming visit of Mikoyan, "an old friend of Cuba." Gomez Wanguemert, in a 1 November broadcast, provided the first hint of what was expected from the visit: There was "no doubt" that the Soviet Deputy Premier would hold long talks in Cuba, "not only on economic matters, but also about the present situation."

PRENSA LATINA reported that naval exercises scheduled for 30 and 31 October and 1 and 2 November had been "suspended," but Havana broadcasts continued to carry the original announcement that the maneuvers would take place.

CPR SUPPORT

Continuing to publicize worldwide support for Cuba, broadcasts pointed to expressions of support in the Chinese Communist press and reported the big pro-Cuba demonstrations throughout the CPR.

CHILEAN ATTITUDE

Playing heavily on the theme of virtually unanimous support for Cuba in the hemisphere, Havana did not acknowledge reports that terrorist attempts in Chile had induced President Alessandri to call a meeting of his cabinet to consider breaking relations with Cuba. PRENSA LATINA recounted a meeting of the Political Committee of the Chilean Communist Party which endorsed the Cuban stand in the crisis and called for a new policy which would place Chile squarely behind Castro. Other dispatches represented statements by the Chilean President and Foreign Minister as indicating that relations with Cuba were likely to grow closer.

BRAZILIAN
PROPOSAL

Except for Gomez Wanguemert's favorable appraisal on 26 October of the Brazilian proposal that Latin America be made a nuclear-free zone, Havana commentators evinced little interest in such a solution. Kuchilan did say on 1 November that President Goulart's special representative, General Albino da Silva, had returned home "entirely satisfied with the results of his mission."

CASTRO'S 1 NOVEMBER
SPEECH

In his television statement at 0145 GMT on 2 November (2045 hours on 1 November Cuban time), Castro read the "shorthand version" of his and President Dorticos' 30 October talk with U Thant. Quoting his own remarks during the meeting, Castro again rejected inspection as "one more attempt to humiliate our country." He stated that "the Soviet Government's decision to withdraw the arms of a strategic nature which had been brought for the defense of the Republic of Cuba should have sufficed," making inspection unnecessary.

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He insisted that "the Cuban Government has not hindered the withdrawal of those arms, and the Soviet Government's decision is in itself a decision of a public nature." The United States, he said, knew that "in fact, the strategic weapons are being withdrawn." If the United States wanted, "besides that," to "humiliate our country, it will not get it," he declared. He asked why the U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba should need no additional guarantee, while "the Soviet Union's commitment to withdraw its strategic weapons" did.

After referring briefly to the nature of the second, "confidential," meeting with U Thant, Castro enumerated the reasons why Cuba would not accept inspection, and stated that a solution must depend on fulfillment of Cuban conditions--his "five points." He declared that Cuba "has not renounced the right to possess the kinds of weapons we may consider convenient in the exercise of our country's sovereign power." He maintained that if the agreement by which the United States possessed the Guantanamo base was considered legitimate, then agreements between the Soviet Government and "the most free government of Cuba, by virtue of which those strategic missiles were situated in our country," were "even more legitimate."

Castro then turned to an acknowledgment of Soviet-Cuban differences, followed by a profession of confidence in the Soviet leadership:

It must be said that during the development of the crisis there arose some differences between the Soviet Government and the Cuban Government. ... It is not here that we should discuss those problems, where our enemies might find it useful or try to profit from those discussions. We must discuss this with the Soviets at the level of government and party, sit down with them to discuss everything that might be necessary in the light of reason and principles.

It must be said that, above all, we are Marxist-Leninists. Between the Soviet Union and Cuba there shall be no breaches! We want to say another thing: that we have confidence in the principled policy of the Soviet Union and we have confidence in the leadership of the Soviet Union--that is to say, in the government and the leading party of the Soviet Union.

He counseled "revolutionaries" not to voice opinions about something they did not understand, as there might be someone around "interested in creating distrust, division, and resentment." Castro then explained the reasons for the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles, acknowledging for the first time that the "strategic weapons" were not Cuban property:

I should like to say that several months ago the Soviet Union decided to cancel all the debts of our country for armaments.

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Some of these matters are of a military nature, which must be treated with great care. Nevertheless, I will explain something: for example, the strategic weapons for our defense. Those weapons, the strategic weapons, were not the property of Cuba. That is not the case with the tanks and an entire series of weapons, which are our property. ... In the agreements by virtue of which they were sent to our country to strengthen our defenses against the threats of attack, it was decided that those strategic weapons, which are very complex and require very specialized personnel, would continue under the direction of Soviet personnel and continue being the property of the Soviet state. That is why, when the Soviet Government decided to withdraw those weapons, which belonged to it, we respected that decision.

In once again acknowledging Cuban displeasure, he counseled forbearance in view, among other things, of Soviet "generosity":

Although we may have some well-founded reason for discontent over some fact, some detail, we must, more than ever, remember how good, generous, noble, and friendly the Soviets have been toward us, and I was precisely speaking of the technicians....

Castro assured the Cubans that even with the withdrawal of the strategic weapons, the country had "extraordinary resources" and "formidable" and "powerful" means of defense. At the same time, he spoke of the Cuban people's "long-range moral missiles that cannot be dismantled and will never be dismantled"--a line Communist China's PEOPLE'S DAILY and KWANGMING DAILY picked up and quoted in editorials on 5 November praising Castro for standing firm despite "appeasement" and "another Munich." Castro's "moral missiles" metaphor accorded with Peking's line that men, not weapons, are decisive--that "imperialism" with its weapons is only "outwardly strong" (a "paper tiger") and that the course of history is decided by reliance on the people's revolutionary struggle, not by "the weapons which imperialists and reactionaries deem all-important."

2-6 NOVEMBER

There was no noteworthy change in the pattern of Havana propaganda. The largest amount of attention was given to reports of sympathy and support for the Cuban position offered by groups, organizations, and agencies in foreign countries, especially in Latin America. Reports of enthusiastic support on the home front--among workers, farmers, and militia members--received almost as much coverage. There were frequent claims of unanimous approval of Castro's five demands, including relinquishment of the Guantanamo base.

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**TREATMENT OF
CASTRO INTERVIEW** Cuban transmitters gave saturation coverage to Castro's 1 November television statement. Havana's service to the Americas dropped normal programming to replay recordings of the statement. Excerpts of the interview were rebroadcast repeatedly, both in domestic and international beams. The portions most frequently emphasized by commentators were Castro's rejection of international inspection on Cuban soil and his assurances of lasting Cuban-Soviet friendship.

**"COMRADELY"
DIFFERENCES** Touching on the "differences" between Havana and Moscow, comment for both domestic and foreign audiences argued that such differences were relatively unimportant in comparison with the realities of close Soviet-Cuban friendship and Soviet support for Cuba. Thus a broadcast to the Americas on 3 November, playing recordings of Castro's remarks on the subject, pointed out that "the building of socialism, under Cuba's circumstances, is closely tied to aid from the socialist camp and particularly from the Soviet Union." When "differences arise," the commentary said, Castro acknowledges them "in the affectionate tone of comrades speaking to one another, but firmly." It praised "the socialist system's honest clear way of discussing things." And it contrasted the relations "between two proletarian states" with "the submission of the puppet governments of Latin America to imperialism."

MIKOYAN VISIT PRENSA LATINA reported Mikoyan's arrival in Havana on 2 November, noting that he was met by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara. PRENSA LATINA and the Havana radio reported Mikoyan's statement on arrival, described by the agency as a "press interview." The text also appeared in NOTICIAS DE HOY. PRENSA LATINA quoted Mikoyan as recalling that at the beginning of the October revolution, "our people faced many difficulties, and had fewer friends and more enemies than you have today. Therefore, you can be sure of the defense of your work, knowing that the Soviet people are with Cuba, body and soul." Cuban media reported that Mikoyan praised Cuba's "revolutionary spirit," reminisced about his own experiences as a revolutionary, and repeated the assurance he had given in New York that the Cuban people "can always count" on the support of the Soviet Union.

Reportage on his statement in New York, as well as on his first public statements in Havana, stressed his backing of Castro's five points, his remarks about "friendly" conversations with the Cubans, and his criticism of the U.S. press for its handling of the visit.

CHEN I NOTE Kuchilan, on Havana television, heralded Mikoyan's arrival as "the most important current event, naturally." Paraphrasing Mikoyan's New York statement, Kuchilan expanded on his remark

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that many nations supported the Cuban position, and in this context noted briefly the message of support from CPR Foreign Minister Chen I. Commentator Fornes, in a domestic service broadcast, called attention to Chen I's note expressing "the resolute support of the great nations of the world for our just cause," but sandwiched the reportage of the note between a citation of PRAVDA and a reference to Mikoyan's statement of "full" Soviet backing for Castro's five points.

Thus carefully emphasizing Soviet support, neither Kuchilan nor Fornes cited the blatantly polemical passages in Chen I's note which had conveyed Peking's view of Soviet behavior in the crisis as betrayal of Cuban and world revolutionary interests. Chen had professed anger that Cuban demands should not be regarded as a factor in the settlement of a crisis "among the big powers," and had declared pointedly that Cuba's destiny was "not in the hands of any other country."

MINIMIZATION OF
SOVIET-CUBAN
"DIFFERENCES"

In publicizing the opening of Mikoyan's talks with Castro, Havana said nothing about their substance and sought to minimize the possibility of discord. Gomez Wanguemert on 3 November said that Castro, in referring to differences between the USSR and Cuba, had "confirmed the correct position of confidence and faith" adopted by the Cuban people. The differences would be discussed and "there will be no breach" between Cuba and the Soviet Union, for "above all we are Marxist-Leninists." Mikoyan's talks with Castro would "without doubt" be "very fruitful."

Gonzalez Jerez, on Havana television, declared in the same vein that the Cubans must continue to trust their friends "headed by the Soviet Union," which "has consistently extended its friendly and generous hand" toward Cuba. Commentator Fornes acknowledged that "more than a few premature judgments were made" in the "dramatic and pressing circumstances." He went on to assure his listeners that Castro, after clarifying "some discrepancies," made "the only possible statement" in affirming friendship with the Soviet Union. Fornes concluded that the "friendship and aid between Cuba and the Soviet Union will emerge more strengthened" from the Castro-Mikoyan talks.

The domestic service reported that Havana University would hold a week in "homage to the USSR" to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution.

REFUSAL OF
INSPECTION

Havana comment continued to uphold Castro's obdurate stand against inspection. A PRENSA LATINA review of the 2 November Havana press said that REVOLUCION "stressed" Cuba's refusal to allow international inspection. The national leadership of the Committees for Defense of the Revolution adopted a

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resolution backing Castro's stand against inspection; and a special broadcast to Peru, quoting Castro, declared that Cuba could not compromise its sovereignty by allowing inspection teams on its soil.

While there was relatively little mention of Red Cross inspection, a PRENSA LATINA dispatch on 5 November said an International Red Cross delegation would talk to U Thant concerning inspection of "Soviet ships on the high seas," after which "it is thought that the United States will lift its illegal blockade against Cuba." Gomez Wanguemert, commenting on Havana television, cited Geneva reports that the International Red Cross had accepted the "uncommon mission" of inspection of the cargo of Cuban-bound ships for what "the North American government classified as offensive" arms.

THE PRESIDENT'S
2 NOVEMBER
STATEMENT

Havana radio said little about President Kennedy's statement of 2 November, although PRENSA LATINA transmitted the text and a broadcast on 3 November commented that "Kennedy ratified his aggressive policy" and "intimated that the blockade will continue in effect for the time being, without making it clear when it will cease." A radio commentary on 6 November said "Mr. Kennedy admitted" that the Soviet Government had "complied with its obligations"; thus, the radio complained, the United States should have suspended the quarantine and "terminated its air surveillance," but instead it "reimposed the blockade" after U Thant's visit.

U-2 FLIGHTS
OVER CUBA

Castro's 1 November announcement that the body of U-2 pilot Rudolf Anderson would be returned to the United States for "humane reasons" was followed a few days later by vituperative comment in Havana media denouncing U.S. air surveillance. A domestic service commentary on 6 November hoped the Cuban Government would not be "compelled to return more bodies of pilots of Yankee pirate and spy planes" to the United States. An English-language commentary portrayed more regret in Cuba than in the United States at the death of Major Anderson. A broadcast to the Americas, recalling that U-2 planes were also shot down over the USSR and the CPR, reported that "all our papers" carried photographs of the "spy plane" shot down over Cuba on 27 October.

LATIN AMERICAN
ATTITUDES

Havana commentators continued to avoid discussion of the position of other Latin American governments in the Cuban crisis. But a PRENSA LATINA dispatch datelined Motevideo reported that the Argentine air force and navy were cooperating with the United States. It quoted the Uruguayan paper EPOCA as saying

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that Argentina had "lost its noble, principled position" which for an entire century had "opposed U.S. intervention" in other Latin American states. PRENSA LATINA dispatches from other Latin American capitals reported "false accusations" spread by U.S. news agencies to the effect that Cuba was promoting revolts in various countries. Havana radio on 3 November quoted PRAVDA in asserting that these stories were disseminated so that the United States would have "a pretext for attacking Cuba."

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